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THINK OF THE CHILDREN: USING IIED TO
REFORMULATE DISTURBING SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
Richard Lorren Jolly*
The Colorado State Court of Appeals recently upheld an injunction restricting pub-
lic displays of aborted fetuses. The court held that the restriction passed strict
scrutiny because the state had a compelling interest in protecting children from the
psychological harm of “disturbing images” and the injunction was narrowly tai-
lored. This marked the first time an injunction had been upheld on this rationale.
This Note critiques that holding and others. It contends that while some federal
and state courts have recognized the interest in protecting the psychological well-
being of children from disturbing speech as compelling, the interest is not supported
by precedent. It then argues that courts have formulated the interest with a breadth
that is flawed and antithetical to the First Amendment. It concludes by proposing
that the state’s interest in protecting children from disturbing speech should be refor-
mulated in the mold of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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INTRODUCTION
On Palm Sunday in 2005, demonstrators gathered outside of St.
John’s Church in Denver, Colorado to protest the Episcopal
Church’s liberal stance on abortion.1 They stood on the public side-
walk and in the street, carrying signs depicting aborted fetuses.2
The signs measured approximately three-and-a-half by four-and-a-
half feet and were visible to the parishioners as they arrived, as well
as during outdoor church services.3 Children were among the pa-
rishioners, and roughly two hundred of them saw the graphic
images.4 The signs frightened many children and at least one exhib-
ited distress for several days.5
St. John’s Church successfully sued the demonstrators on claims
for nuisance and the trial court enjoined further protests.6 On ap-
peal, the Colorado Court of Appeals modified the injunction but
maintained a restriction on “displays depicting gruesome images of muti-
lated fetuses or dead bodies in a manner reasonably likely to be viewed by
children under 12 years of age attending worship services and/or wor-
ship-related events . . . .”7 The demonstrators again appealed. The
Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the modified injunction, stating
that although the restriction on “gruesome images” was content-
based and thus subject to strict scrutiny, there existed a “compelling
governmental interest in protecting children from disturbing
images, and . . . conclude[d] that the prohibition [was] narrowly
tailored.”8 It then defined disturbing images as “the kind of im-
age[s] likely to cause young children psychological harm.”9 The
Colorado Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari.10
Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott is the first case to up-
hold an injunction based on a compelling state interest in
protecting children’s psychological well-being from disturbing
images. The interest itself, however, is not entirely novel. A number
1. Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s I), 194 P.3d 475, 478
(Colo. App. 2008).
2. See id.
3. See Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II), 296 P.3d 273, 275,
284 n.12 (Colo. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2798 (2013).
4. Saint John’s I, 194 P.3d at 484.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 479.
7. Saint John’s II, 296 P.3d at 276.
8. Id. at 281.
9. Id. at 285.
10. Scott v. Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness, 133 S. Ct. 2798 (2013); Scott v. Saint
John’s Church in the Wilderness, No. 12SC658, 2013 WL 119791 (Colo. Jan. 7, 2013).
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of recent federal and state courts have also found that protecting
children from disturbing speech is a compelling interest.11 Further-
more, no court has explicitly found the interest not to be
compelling.12 And while it must be noted that in all of these cases
the disturbing speech at issue has been pro-life abortion speech—a
category that some argue has become judicially disfavored13—this
does not mean the holdings will remain a jurisprudential anomaly.
Legislatures have increasingly attempted to restrict gruesome
speech in other contexts, including in areas such as video games
and animal cruelty.14 Recognizing this interest as compelling there-
fore represents a significant development that may have rippling
consequences.
Surprisingly, though, disturbing speech cases have seen little aca-
demic scrutiny. At the time of writing, only two journal articles and
a student note have emerged on the topic.15 These writings, particu-
larly the recent piece by Eugene Volokh, provide an excellent
initiation. But despite their insightful analyses, none of the authors
11. See Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1999); Bering v. SHARE,
721 P.2d 918, 935 (Wash. 1986); Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 275 P.3d 438, 461
(Wyo. 2012).
12. Two decisions have come close to this conclusion. In Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc.
v. City of Springboro, the Sixth Circuit held that a police officer who stopped a billboard truck
displaying images of aborted fetuses while children were present was not covered by qualified
immunity because a reasonable officer would have known that detaining a subject because of
his speech violated the First Amendment. 477 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, the
court did not address whether protecting children from the images was a compelling inter-
est. See id. at 828–29. Likewise, in Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff
Department, the Ninth Circuit dealt with images of aborted fetuses displayed around a public
middle school. 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). The opinion concerned the compelling interest
of schools to be free from disruption, not the compelling interest in protecting children
from disturbing images. Id. In short, no court has refused to recognize a compelling state
interest in protecting children from disturbing speech.
13. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What is
before us, after all, is a speech regulation directed against the opponents of abortion, and it
therefore enjoys the benefit of the ‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that the Court has set in
motion to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly
favored practice.”). The notion that restrictions on disturbing speech are an example of im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination will not be discussed; rather, this Note assumes that
courts are earnestly concerned with the psychological well-being of children.
14. For an overview of recent legislative restrictions on gruesome and disturbing speech,
see Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2015).
15. Volokh, supra note 14 (providing the first general review of courts’ treatment of
disturbing speech in various contexts); Clay Calvert et al., Gruesome Images, Shocking Speech &
Harm to Minors: Judicial Pushback Against the First Amendment After Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association?, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127 (2014) (critiquing the St. John’s II
opinion in light of Brown); Katie J. Koski, Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Expression: Wyo-
ming Says Protecting Children Comes Second to Protecting Freedom of Speech; Operation Save
America v. City of Jackson, 275 P.3d 438 (Wyo. 2012), 13 WYO. L. REV. 679 (2013) (critiquing
the Wyoming court for not recognizing the restriction as content-neutral in the titular case).
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attempt to reconcile the state’s desire to protect children from psy-
chological distress with speakers’ First Amendment rights. This is
especially true of Volokh’s piece. Though his argument for protect-
ing most all forms of disturbing speech is informative, he fails to
acknowledge that states have any legitimate interest in protecting
children from the resulting effects. And though Katie Koski argues
in favor of recognizing this state interest, she undervalues speakers’
rights by advancing an exceedingly broad reading of the First
Amendment’s juvenile exceptions.16 Consequently, these writings
provide little guidance on how to proceed in this developing area
of the law.
This Note takes a different tack. It assumes that courts are not
necessarily mistaken in recognizing some state interest in protect-
ing children from disturbing speech, but asserts that they have
heretofore formulated that interest with an imprecision antithetical
to the First Amendment. Part I provides an overview of the First
Amendment’s protection of offensive speech. It then reviews those
cases that have recognized the state interest in protecting children
from disturbing speech as compelling. Part II contends that in sup-
port of this interest, these courts have relied upon inapplicable
precedent concerning speech that is obscene for minors and inde-
cent broadcasts. In so doing, it argues, these decisions have created
a new category of disfavored speech that runs contrary to First
Amendment principles. Part III proposes a more precise formula-
tion of the interest, asserting that it should be reformulated in the
mold of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED). It concludes by addressing some of the potential obstacles
associated with this proposal.
I. BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMPELLING INTERESTS
The issues in Saint John’s II and similar cases implicate the core of
the First Amendment. It is therefore necessary to situate the discus-
sion around the protections and judicial approaches to that
provision. Section I-A provides an overview of the First Amend-
ment’s breadth, stressing that its protections extend to speech that
is offensive to audiences. Section I-B reviews those cases that have
acknowledged a compelling state interest in protecting children
from disturbing speech. It notes that although the Supreme Court
16. Koski, supra note 15, at 705–07. See Section II.A., infra, for a comprehensive analysis
of the First Amendment’s juvenile exceptions.
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has been silent, a number of federal and state courts have recog-
nized the interest as compelling and no court has explicitly found it
not to be.
A. The First Amendment Provides Broad Protection
The First Amendment reflects a “profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open . . . .”17 Through this rich and unregulated
marketplace, the truth of an idea is tested, citizens are informed,
and democracy is realized.18 As a result, the First Amendment pro-
tects almost all speech, especially that which touches on political
and religious issues. The current formulation of the compelling
state interest in protecting children from disturbing speech is re-
pugnant to these ideas.
There is no question that the images at issue in the disturbing
speech cases implicate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has read “speech” expansively to encompass all mediums and con-
duct that contain sufficient communicative elements.19 Likewise,
images of aborted fetuses do not fall within the “well-defined and
narrowly limited” categories of speech that are of “such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and mo-
rality.”20 Among those categories of low-value speech are false
statements of fact, incitement, obscenity, fighting words, and child
pornography.21 Graphic images of aborted fetuses may be objec-
tionable, but they are not obviously proscribable.
Not only are depictions of aborted fetuses not low-value speech,
they often represent the kind of core political speech that lies at the
heart of the First Amendment.22 The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that speech on political issues occupies the “highest rung
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
18. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market . . . .”).
19. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989) (holding that burning the Ameri-
can flag is speech for purposes of the First Amendment).
20. Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
21. Even these particular classes of low-value speech are not wholly without constitu-
tional protection. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 194–95 (1983).
22. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982) (“[S]peech to
protest racial discrimination is essential political speech lying at the core of the First Amend-
ment.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” and is entitled to spe-
cial protection.23 And while it is in the nature of political and
religious speech to result in excesses and abuse, broad protection is
essential to enlightened public opinion and a functioning democ-
racy.24 Pro-life protests provide an apt example of such
quintessentially protected speech. And though the legality of abor-
tion is settled, the First Amendment protects the “right to attempt
to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed
simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his audi-
ence.”25 Thus, any restrictions on this kind of speech are highly
suspect.
Of course the injunction in St. John’s II did not explicitly target
communication on abortion. Rather, it prevented protestors from
displaying certain types of images at a specific time and place at
which children were most likely to be present.26 But this does not
mean that the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner
restriction.27 Such restrictions are permissible only if they are justi-
fied without regard to the content of the speech.28 Indeed, “above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter or its content.”29 The injunction in St. John’s II deviates from
this rule by explicitly restricting “displays depicting gruesome
images.”30 The adjective ‘gruesome’ directly modifies the noun
‘images,’ meaning that the injunction touched only images with
specified content while leaving all others unregulated.31 Without
23. Id. at 913 (internal quotation omitted).
24. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“In the realm of religious faith,
and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise . . . . To persuade others to his own
point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men
who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the
people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that . . . these liberties are . . .
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy.”).
25. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (upholding a statute prohibiting any per-
son from approaching within eight feet of another person near a health care facility without
consent).
26. Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II), 296 P.3d 273, 276
(Colo. App. 2012).
27. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (upholding an ordinance that
completely banned picketing “before or about” any residence).
28. See id.
29. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
30. Saint John’s II, 296 P.3d at 276.
31. The Saint John’s II court’s more broad formulation of disturbing images as those
“likely to cause young children psychological harm” is still a content-based restriction despite
being defined by the audience’s reaction. 296 P.3d at 284–85. Because the audience’s reac-
tion is derived from the content of the speech, the restriction is content-based. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (finding that limiting the psychological impact of speech is a
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satisfying precise requirements, content-based restrictions such as
this are generally invalid.32
B. State and Federal Courts Have Recognized the Interest in Protecting
Children from Disturbing Speech as Compelling
Although the images in St. John’s II fall within the broad protec-
tion of the First Amendment, this does not necessarily render the
injunction unconstitutional. Courts may uphold content-based in-
junctions if the state demonstrates that the restriction passes strict
scrutiny; that is, the restriction must be “necessary to serve a com-
pelling state interest” and “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”33
The injunction in St. John’s II was the first to pass strict scrutiny
based on the compelling state interest in protecting children from
the psychological effects of disturbing images. However, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Wyoming Supreme Court, and the
Washington Supreme Court have also recognized this interest as
compelling.
In Olmer v. City of Lincoln, the city passed an ordinance proscrib-
ing all “focused picketing” of churches and other religious premises
“thirty minutes before, during, and thirty minutes after any sched-
uled religious activity.”34 In passing the ordinance, the city council
found that “infants and young children are emotionally vulnerable
to focused picketing . . . [and] tend to react with fear, unhappiness,
anxiety and other emotional disturbances when such activity is im-
posed on them.”35 The Eighth Circuit agreed, explaining: “The
city’s interest in protecting very young children from frightening
images is constitutionally important; that is, the interest is ‘signifi-
cant,’ ‘compelling,’ and ‘legitimate.’”36 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the ordinance was overly broad because it applied
to all images rather than just those which were psychologically
harmful to children.37
content-based purpose). For a recent and in-depth discussion of the content-based versus
content-neutral distinction within the context of disturbing speech, see Volokh, supra note
14, at 908–10.
32. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
33. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
34. Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1999), overruled in part as to a
different matter by Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 692 (8th Cir. 2012) (en
banc).
35. Id. at 1183.
36. Id. at 1180.
37. Id.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has also acknowledged a compel-
ling state interest in protecting children from disturbing images.
The preliminary injunction in Operation Save America v. City of Jack-
son thwarted a pro-life group from displaying graphic images of
aborted fetuses at a public Boy Scouts festival.38 In reviewing the
injunction, the court explicitly declared: “The need to protect the
psychological well-being of children has been recognized as a com-
pelling government interest.”39 Nevertheless, the court struck down
the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the record did not
demonstrate a sufficiently clear causal link between the disturbing
speech and the supposed injury.40 The state interest itself, however,
was firmly certified as compelling.41
Finally, in Bering v. SHARE, the Washington Supreme Court up-
held an injunction against abortion protestors using particular
language, rather than images, that the court considered harmful to
children.42 In that case, the injunction prohibited “referring, in oral
statements while at the picket site, to physicians or patients, staff, or
clients as ‘murdering’ or ‘murderers,’ ‘killing’ or ‘killers’; or to chil-
dren or babies as being ‘killed’ or ‘murdered’ by anyone in the
Medical building.”43 The Washington Supreme Court found that
these words “inflicted trauma” and that there existed a compelling
state interest in “avoiding subjection of children to the physical and
psychological abuse inflicted by the picketers’ speech.”44 It con-
cluded, however, that the injunction was not narrowly tailored
because it applied at all times, and therefore remanded the case
with instructions to narrow the injunction so as to apply only when
children were present.45
Irrespective of these decisions, protecting children’s psychologi-
cal well-being from disturbing images is not clearly established as a
compelling state interest. There is no direct United States Supreme
Court precedent on the matter. In fact, the closest Supreme Court
support for recognizing the interest is found in a recent dissenting
opinion. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice Ste-
phen Breyer supported recognizing a proscribable category of
speech based on the general “protection of children.”46 Yet even
38. Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 275 P.3d 438, 445 (Wyo. 2012).
39. Id. at 460.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 933 (Wash. 1986).
43. Id. at 924.
44. Id. at 933, 935.
45. Id. at 936.
46. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2762 (2011) (Breyer J., dissenting).
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there, Justice Breyer relied on precedent that establishes far nar-
rower formulations of the state interest in protecting children.47
Thus, aside from the above-outlined cases, there is no precedent
that recognizes a state interest in protecting children’s nondescript
psychological well-being from disturbing speech. To the contrary,
there is a substantial body of case law antagonistic to speech restric-
tions based on audiences’ reactions—even audiences comprised of
children.
II. THE COURTS’ FORMULATION OF THE INTEREST IS FLAWED
Those courts recognizing a compelling state interest in protect-
ing children from disturbing speech have drawn inappropriately
from case law governing children’s access to other categories of
speech. Section II-A addresses speech that is obscene for minors. It
argues that this constitutional exception is narrow and applies only
to explicitly sexual speech. Section II-B considers indecent speech.
It notes that this constitutional exception is also narrow, applying
only in the limited context of broadcast media. Finally, Section II-C
argues that restrictions on disturbing speech are an affront to estab-
lished First Amendment principles. These restrictions grant
children a heckler’s veto, deprive audiences’ access to protected
speech, and limit substantially the opportunities for effective com-
munication of certain ideas.
A. Disturbing Speech is Not Obscene for Minors
Those courts that acknowledge a compelling state interest in pro-
tecting children from disturbing speech have invariably relied upon
the obscene-for-minors exception to the First Amendment.48  This
reliance is erroneous. At the core of the obscene-for-minors line of
cases is explicitly sexual communication.49 Because disturbing
47. For instance, Justice Breyer cites Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) to
support his claim. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2762. However, the state interest recognized there was
in protecting the psychological well-being of children from the specific harms of child labor.
Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
48. See Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting the dis-
trict court, which relied on Sable Communications of California Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989), which cited directly to Ginsberg); Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 933 (Wash.
1986); Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 275 P.3d 438, 461 (Wyo. 2012); Saint John’s
Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II), 296 P.3d 273, 284 (Colo. App. 2012).
49. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735 (“[Ginsberg v. New York] approved a prohibition on the
sale to minors of sexual material that would be obscene from the perspective of a child.”).
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speech is not necessarily sexual, it cannot be restricted under this
rationale.
Though it has long been clear that the First Amendment does
not protect obscene speech,50 only fifty years have passed since the
Supreme Court articulated the definition of obscenity in Miller v.
California. There, the Court held that the determinative guideline is
whether an average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work taken as a whole: appeals to the
prurient interest; depicts in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct; and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.51 Speech meeting these criteria may be completely pro-
scribed by appropriate legislation.
But there are certain types of speech that while not obscene
under Miller are nevertheless inappropriate for children and may
be regulated. The foundational case on this point is Ginsberg v. New
York, in which the Supreme Court upheld New York legislation re-
stricting minors’ access to pornographic magazines.52 The Court
summarily accepted that the magazines were not obscene for adults
and thus could not be generally outlawed.53 However, the Court
accepted New York’s reasoning that the pornographic nature of the
material was “a basic factor impairing the ethical and moral devel-
opment of its youth,” and found that it was “utterly without
redeeming social importance for children.”54 The Court then up-
held the regulation, famously recognizing “that even where there is
an invasion of protected freedoms, the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults.”55
Although Ginsberg’s broad language suggests that the obscene-
for-minors exception can stretch to reach all content with undesir-
able effects on children, subsequent cases have foreclosed this
reading. For instance, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
the Supreme Court struck down a California statute that prohibited
the sale of violent video games to minors, holding that violent
50. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 481 (1957) (“[T]his Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the
freedoms of speech and press.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amend-
ment, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857, 1865 (2007) (“Although there was no clear consensus in 1792
that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment, obscenity has in fact been regu-
lated by every state in the nation since Anthony Comstock launched his anti-obscenity
campaign in the 1860s.”).
51. Miller, 413 U.S at 24 (internal citations omitted).
52. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
53. Id. at 634.
54. Id. at 633, 641.
55. Id. at 638.
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speech did not fall within the obscene-for-minors exception.56 The
Court specified that Ginsberg stood for the narrow proposition that
the legislature could “adjust the boundaries of an existing category
of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for
adults is not uncritically applied to children.”57 But as the Court
explained, the restriction attempted to “create a wholly new cate-
gory of content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech
directed at children.”58 Concluding “violence is not part of the ob-
scenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated,” the Court
deemed the statute unconstitutional.59
Disturbing speech, like violent speech, is not a traditionally re-
stricted category of communication and thus its parameters may
not be adjusted in order to apply to children.60 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized only one category of speech—explicit
sexual communication—as obscene-for-minors. Disturbing speech
is not necessarily explicitly sexual61 and thus does not fall within
Ginsberg’s narrow exception.62 Nevertheless, every court that has
recognized a compelling state interest in shielding children from
disturbing speech has cited Ginsberg for the general proposition
that the state may protect children’s psychological well-being.63 This
misapplication of precedent is one of kind, not simply degree. It
conflates the established interest in regulating children’s access to
sexual material with the unprecedented interest in securing chil-
dren from nondescript psychological harm. These two interests are
distinct, and the obscene-for-minors precedent is immaterial to the
disturbing speech cases.
56. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (2011).
57. Id. at 2735.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. It is likely impossible to articulate a difference between these two categories based
on their content. For instance, it is not clear whether footage from a video game depicting “a
character who shoots out a police officer’s knee, douses him with gasoline, lights him on fire,
urinates on his burning body, and finally kills him with a gunshot to the head” (see id. at 2764
(Breyer J., dissenting)) is protected as violent speech, or proscribable as disturbing speech.
61. Even the images of aborted fetuses that are invariably at issue in disturbing speech
cases are not inherently sexual. Though they broadly imply sexual activity through their sub-
ject matter, it cannot be seriously argued that the images appeal to the prurient interest.
62. For an additional discussion on the inapplicability of the obscene as to youths excep-
tion, see Volokh, supra note 14, at 939.
63. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180; Bering, 721 P.2d at 933; Operation Save Am., 275 P.3d
at 461; Saint John’s II, 296 P.3d at 284.
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B. Disturbing Speech is Not Indecent Speech
Courts approving a compelling state interest in protecting chil-
dren from disturbing speech have also invariably drawn from case
law governing indecent speech.64 Like these courts’ references to
Ginsberg’s obscene-for-minors doctrine, this comparison is also ill-
founded. The indecent speech cases focus on broadcast media, and
their outcomes turn on the idea that radio and television constitute
an intrusion. The intrusion problem is absent in the public display
of disturbing speech. Thus, the indecent speech line of cases pro-
vides no countenance for addressing disturbing images.65
The state has broad regulatory control over the content that is
broadcast through traditional media channels such as radio and tel-
evision. The Court first recognized this power in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.66 In that case, the Court considered a parent’s com-
plaint over a radio broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s
monologue titled “Filthy Words.”67 The monologue involved the re-
peated use of “vulgar and offensive” language, and aired at two in
the afternoon.68 In reviewing the complaint, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) found that it had the power to regulate
“any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communications.”69 The Supreme Court agreed with the Commis-
sion and held that the state’s compelling interest in protecting
children went beyond regulating material that is obscene for mi-
nors and included indecent speech.70
Central to the holding in Pacifica is that the indecent speech
broadcasted at a time when children were likely in the audience.
The Court reasoned that “the concept of ‘indecent’ is intimately
connected with the exposure of children [to speech that is] pa-
tently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
64. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1185 n.4; Bering, 721 P.2d at 935; Operation Save Am., 275
P.3d at 460; Saint John’s II, 296 P.3d at 283.
65. For an additional take on the argument that the Saint John’s II court misapplied the
indecent speech precedent, see Volokh, supra note 14, at 939.
66. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).
67. The monologue was, fittingly, a comic satire of words permitted and prohibited on
television and radio. See id. at 751 (transcript of the monologue included in opinion
appendix).
68. Id. at 757.
69. Id. at 731 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
70. Id. at 758 (Powell J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The
Commission properly held that the speech from which society may attempt to shield its chil-
dren is not limited to that which appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language
involved in this case is as potentially degrading and harmful to children as representations of
many erotic acts.”).
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for the broadcast medium.”71 The unique qualities of broadcasts make
them subject to greater regulation. The Court emphasized that ra-
dio and television “have established a uniquely pervasive presence
in the lives of all Americans.”72 Indecent broadcasts confront citi-
zens like an intruder in the home, where they are “uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read.”73 The Court
concluded that the state therefore has an interest in supporting
“parents’ claim to authority in their own household,” and may
channel indecent speech to times when children are less likely to be
in the audience.74
Moreover, the understanding that broadcast audiences are cap-
tive in their homes is critical to understanding the indecent speech
cases. Audiences may be considered “captive” when the context of
the situation “makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or audi-
tor to avoid exposure.”75 Because of the ease with which broadcasts
may be accessed accidentally, courts perceive audiences as lacking
any meaningful opportunity to avoid unwanted content. Sable Com-
munications of California, Inc. v. FCC clarified the legal significance
of this point.76 That case dealt with a regulation targeting explicitly
sexual telephone messages.77 The Court noted that telephones,
while also pervasive in homes, did not pose the same concerns as
traditional broadcasts because telephones require the audience “to
take affirmative steps to receive the communication.”78 Conse-
quently, unlike in Pacifica, there was no “captive audience problem”
and the FCC could not constitutionally block the provocative calls.79
Publicly displayed images of aborted fetuses are not comparable
to indecent speech since citizens in a traditional public forum are
not captive.80 Although citizens in public spaces are similarly sub-
jected to sudden and unwanted speech, they do not have the same
privacy interests as they do inside their homes.81 To the contrary,
the First Amendment provides its most expansive protection to
71. Id. at 731–32 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
72. Id. at 748.
73. Id. at 749.
74. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
75. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1975).
76. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
77. Id. at 117–18.
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id. For an alternative argument that Saint John’s II does raise a captive audience
problem, see Koski, supra note 15, at 684.
80. For a discussion of the captive audience problem in relation to disturbing speech,
see Volokh, supra note 14, at 901, and Koski, supra note 15.
81. This is true even within the narrow context of worship services. Though some may
argue that parishioners are rendered captive by their spiritual duties, this does not eradicate
the protection afforded to traditional public fora. See, e.g., Survivors Network of Those
508 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:2
speech in parks, streets, and sidewalks, as these places have “imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”82 In
these public fora, the Supreme Court rationalized, citizens can “ef-
fectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes.”83
The Supreme Court’s ocular advice applies to children in public
as well. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, decided three years before
Pacifica, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting
drive-in movie theaters with publicly visible screens from screening
movies containing nudity.84 Jacksonville maintained that the regula-
tion was motivated by its interest in protecting children from the
purportedly harmful images.85 The Court acknowledged that the
city’s compelling interest in regulating pornographic material was
established in Ginsberg, but held that the ordinance failed, as it was
not narrowly tailored.86 The Court explained that completely ban-
ning all movies containing nudity regulated too much protected
content to serve the state’s compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from the adverse effects of pornography.87
Important for public forum analysis, however, is that in nearly
the same breath the Court concluded that Jacksonville’s ordinance
could also not be justified as preventing an intrusion. This is be-
cause the regulation sought “only to keep these films from being
seen from public streets and places where the offended viewer read-
ily [could] avert his eyes.”88 Taken together, these points confirm
that even in public, “[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths
Abused by Priests, Inc. v. Joyce, 779 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that Texas’ Wor-
shiper Protection Act, which prohibited “intentionally disturbing a house of worship by using
profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior . . . either within the house of worship or so
near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the worship services,” impermissibly restricted
speech in the public fora surrounding houses of worship).
82. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
83. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); See also Madsen v. Women’s Health
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (holding that an injunction on “images observable”
from inside an abortion clinic was too broad because the clinic could simply “pull its cur-
tains . . . to avoid seeing placards . . . .”).
84. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206–07 (1975).
85. Id. at 212–13.
86. Id.
87. The Court concluded that children had a First Amendment right to access such
protected speech as “the nude body of a war victim.” Id. at 213. Of course, that children’s
access to images of war victims is quintessentially protected speech raises again the defini-
tional problem of recognizing disturbing speech as a proscribable category of speech.
88. Id. at 212.
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nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be sup-
pressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that [the
government] thinks unsuitable for them.”89 As a result, the inde-
cent speech reasoning is patently inapplicable to disturbing speech
in a traditional public forum.
C. The Current Formulation is Antithetical to the First Amendment
By drawing on inapposite case law, those courts recognizing a
compelling state interest in protecting children from disturbing
speech have created an unprecedented category of proscribable
communication. And while the interest in safeguarding the psycho-
logical well-being of children is not necessarily suspect in itself, the
courts’ broad formulation of the interest is discordant with several
established First Amendment principles. The current formulation
grants children a heckler’s veto, deprives audience access to pro-
tected content, and limits substantially the opportunities for
effective communication of certain ideas.
First, it is firmly settled that “the [F]irst [A]mendment knows no
heckler’s veto.”90 That is to say, “under our Constitution the public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas
are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”91 Moreover, it is
equally established that there is no “‘minors’ exception to the pro-
hibition on banning speech because of listeners’ reactions.”92 Yet
those courts recognizing a compelling state interest in protecting
children from disturbing speech have ignored these First Amend-
ment axioms. For example, as the court in St. John’s II defined it,
disturbing speech refers only to those communications that are
“likely to cause . . . psychological harm.”93 Communication that is
unlikely to negatively affect children may not be restricted. For ex-
ample, despite its graphic imagery, the crucifix displayed inside of
St. John’s Church does not pose a risk of psychological harm and
89. Id. at 213–14.
90. Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th Cir. 2001).
91. Bacchellar v. Maryland 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970) (quoting Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
92. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780,
790 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It would . . . be an unprecedented departure from bedrock First
Amendment principles to allow the government to restrict speech based on listener reaction
simply because the listeners are children.”).
93. Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II), 296 P.3d 273, 285
(Colo. App. 2012).
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remains free from the injunction.94 Indeed, under the current ap-
proach to disturbing speech, the fear of the audience’s reaction
alone creates the state interest in regulating the content—a text-
book heckler’s veto.
Second, by predicating protection of disturbing speech on the
presence of minors, courts have created a perverse incentive to stra-
tegically wield children so as to deprive audiences of messages they
have a constitutional right to receive.95 The Supreme Court has
noted this concern before. In addressing legislation that prohibited
knowingly communicating indecent material to minors over the In-
ternet, the Court held that the law unconstitutionally conferred
“broad powers of censorship . . . upon any opponent of indecent
speech who might simply log on and inform the would-be discour-
sers that [a minor] would be present.”96 The current context
amplifies that concern because in a traditional public forum even
children have a right to receive communication.97 As Judge Richard
Posner eloquently stated, “[Children] must be allowed the freedom
to form their political views on the basis of uncensored speech
before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when
they first exercise the franchise.”98 The current approach to dis-
turbing speech robs children and adults alike of opportunities for
political growth.
Finally, the current articulation of the state’s interest substan-
tially limits the effective communication of certain ideas. The
Supreme Court has observed that messages conveyed without pow-
erful imagery may not be as forceful as those conveyed with it.99
Disturbing images have an emotive function that “may often be the
more important element of the overall message.”100 This is particu-
larly true with images of aborted fetuses, which have been the only
content subject to disturbing speech restrictions thus far. Professor
Laurence Tribe has argued that because of the political vitriol sur-
rounding abortion, “for [many], the life of the fetus becomes an
94. Id.
95. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“[T]he
First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.”).
96. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997).
97. See supra Section II.B.
98. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2011) (ad-
dressing a city ordinance seeking to limit minors’ access to violent video games).
99. See Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 416 n.11 (1989) (holding a prohibition on burn-
ing the American flag unconstitutional, and stating that “messages conveyed without use of
the flag are not “just as forcefu[l]” as those conveyed with it.”).
100. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the conviction of a man
wearing a vulgar anti-war jacket in place where women and children were present was not
justified.).
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invisible abstraction.”101 As a result, prohibiting citizens from con-
fronting public audiences with often unseen images of aborted
fetuses greatly restricts the speakers’ ability to effectively advance
their message.102 Thus, by imprecisely equating disturbing speech
with inapplicable precedent, courts have granted audiences the
power to silence speakers and limit public discourse “to that which
would be suitable for a sandbox.”103
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES A
REFORMULATION OF THE INTEREST
Although the current formulation of the state’s compelling inter-
est in preventing psychological harm to children poses the
aforementioned complications, this does not mean that the interest
is unimportant or illegitimate. It does mean, however, that the in-
terest must be more precisely drawn in order to limit its impact on
constitutional freedoms. For these reasons, Section III-A proposes
the state interest be reformulated in the mold of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress (IIED), with an emphasis on the
assaultive aspect of the tort. Section III-B addresses some of the
problems associated with this proposal, including that disturbing
speech might cause unique harms not reached by an IIED model,
that the proposal might be foreclosed by Snyder v. Phelps, and that
the proposal might not effectively protect children’s psychological
well-being.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Model
In order to regulate otherwise protected content, a state must
relate the speech to a specific, identifiable harm and further show
that the regulation will alleviate that harm.104 This is a two pronged
analysis: the court first considers whether there is a compelling state
101. LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 5 (1980); see also Volokh, supra
note 14.
102. Even the court in Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II)
recognized that for the protestors the disturbing nature of the images was the message itself.
296 P.3d 273, 283 (Colo. App. 2012).
103. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (holding a restriction on
unsolicited contraception advertisements was an illegal restriction of commercial speech).
104. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (“[The state] must demon-
strate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in
fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”).
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interest in preventing the harm, and second, whether the restric-
tion is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.105 These prongs
operate in conjunction with one another: meaning, how the inter-
est is articulated dictates how much tailoring is needed.106 Adjusting
the contours of the state interest can therefore affect which speech
is protected and which is regulable. The chief problem with dis-
turbing speech restrictions is that the state interest has been
formulated so broadly that even narrowly tailored restrictions sweep
up quintessentially protected speech. Courts can prevent this over-
reach by recasting the state’s interest in protecting children’s
psychological well-being in the mold of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED).
It is initially necessary to note that psychological harm has not
always been a legally cognizable injury. In fact, the 1934 Restatement
of the Law of Torts claimed that there was no legal redress for emo-
tional harms.107 Yet this position was not entirely consistent with
precedent and was steadfastly disputed among academics.108 IIED as
a distinct tort thus originated as an academic endeavor in the pages
of the Harvard and Michigan law reviews.109 Though early defini-
tions of the tort were not models of clarity, William Prosser
articulated an initial approach by saying: “It is something very like
assault . . . [consisting] of the intentional, outrageous infliction of
mental suffering in an extreme form.”110 His article and others
helped this ostensibly novel tort become generally recognized, and
by 1948 the Restatement had changed its position on recovery for
emotional harms.111 Today, the tort is recognized in all fifty states
105. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
106. For example, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville the Court held that the state did not
have an interest in restricting all nude movies because not all nudity is considered obscene
for minors or falls within another proscribable category of speech. 422 U.S. 205, 213–14
(1975). The Court then concluded that if the “ordinance is intended to regulate expression
accessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscription.” Id. at 214. Notice that it is the interest
itself which dictates how narrowly tailored the prescription must be. So, if the Court in
Erznoznik had articulated an alternative interest, the narrow tailoring analysis would have
been different and perhaps the regulation would have been upheld. The line between pro-
tected and regulable speech turns on the shape of the state interest.
107. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (Am. Law Inst. 1934).
108. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even-
handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
42, 42 (1982).
109. See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033 (1936); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REV. 874 (1939).
110. Prosser, supra note 109.
111. See Givelber, supra note 108.
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and the District of Columbia.112 Although the precise formulation
differs by jurisdiction, the Restatement (Second) of Torts outlines four
common elements of IIED: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be
intentional or reckless, (2) must be extreme and outrageous, and
(3) must be the cause of (4) severe emotional distress.113
The most critical is the “extreme and outrageous” element. The
chief concern that initially prevented courts from recognizing IIED
was that a plaintiff’s claim of psychological harm may be disingenu-
ous. According to the comments to the Restatement, because of “fear
of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the
difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to liability, the
law has been slow to afford independent protection to the interest
in freedom from emotional distress.”114 The “extreme and outra-
geous” element mostly quiets these concerns, as “[i]t is the
character of such conduct itself which provides the necessary assur-
ance that genuine harm has been done.”115 It guarantees that
annoyances and trivialities do not result in liability.116 And “outra-
geousness” is determined by an objective, reasonable person
standard such that individuals cannot claim unreasonably subjective
harm.117
The state’s compelling interest in restricting disturbing speech
should be reformulated according to these elements of IIED. As in
IIED, disturbing speech restrictions aim to secure persons from un-
reasonable psychological assault.118 Yet unlike the precise
formulation of IIED, the current articulation of the state’s interest
does not compel courts to assess disturbing speech claims with the
cautiousness that redressing psychological harms requires. Parties
can therefore win speech injunctions by making spurious or even
hypothetical claims of psychological harm. For example, consider
again the injuries described in St. John’s II: there, the court noted
only that “[p]arents were concerned” about the effects of the
112. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L.
REV. 789, 806, app. B (2007).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
114. Id. at cmt. b.
115. Prosser, supra note 109, at 879.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The
rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the
meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and un-
kind. . . . There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety
valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.”).
117. See id. (“Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”).
118. For a discussion on this, see infra Section III.B.
514 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:2
images and found that “[the priest’s] daughter buried her face in
her hymnal . . . and remained upset about the images several days
later.”119 It is unlikely that such nondescript emotional distress
would be privately actionable, and it is not clear that the state has
any interest—let alone a compelling interest—in preventing it.120
Courts employing the current formulation credit such harms be-
cause, in contrast to the IIED inquiry, the current approach to
disturbing speech focuses on the content rather than on the
speaker’s conduct. That is, there is no equivalent of either the in-
tentional or the extreme and outrageous elements in the current
disturbing speech test. As a result, courts currently cannot assess the
veracity of the psychological harm that a given restriction purports
to remedy. Some might be tempted to argue that the disturbing
content of the speech itself ensures injuries are authentic. But the
inquiry into the content of the speech is an inadequate substitute
because courts have defined disturbing speech as that which causes
psychological harm.121 As a result, the link between the speech and
the harm is assumed rather than scrutinized, allowing for restric-
tions to be based merely on purportedly disturbing content and the
presence of children. And it is this ad hoc emphasis on the content
that makes the current approach to disturbing speech more likely
to be used for censorship than for preventing actual harms.
Adopting an IIED-based approach would correct these analytic
shortcomings. Under this formulation, the state would have a com-
pelling interest in restricting speech that amounts to an intentional
assault that is outrageous or extreme and the cause of psychological
harm to children. This formulation would shift the analysis away
from the audience’s subjective response to the disturbing content
and onto the speaker’s intentional and assaultive conduct. Shaping
the state’s interest along the contours of the private interest would
provide the necessary indicia of genuine harm and ensure that the
plaintiff’s claims are not unreasonable or brought solely to silence
the speaker. It would also align the state’s interest with established
First Amendment doctrine, as the state would be claiming a com-
pelling interest in directly restricting speech that it may already
indirectly restrict by enforcing civil judgments.122
Of course, there are constitutional limits to traditional IIED
claims, particularly when the speech involves a matter of public
119. Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II), 296 P.3d 273, 284
(Colo. App. 2012).
120. For an argument that the court in Saint John’s II failed to apply the evidentiary stan-
dard demanded by Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, see Calvert et al., supra note 15, at 133.
121. See, e.g., Saint John’s II, 296 P.3d at 285.
122. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
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concern. As the Supreme Court first stated in Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell: “‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and social dis-
course has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a
jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An
‘outrageousness’ standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding re-
fusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audi-
ence.”123 Snyder v. Phelps recently reemphasized this point.124 The
Court there expanded on its definition of public concern for IIED
purposes, stating that “speech deals with matters of public concern
when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of politi-
cal, social, or other concern to the community . . . .”125 Though one
can imagine disturbing speech falling outside of this definition,
abortion speech certainly implicates public concern.
Because of this precedent, it is imperative that the proposed re-
formulation of the state interest emphasizes the speaker’s intent in
directing the speech at children. If the speaker’s primary purpose is
to cause children distress—rather than, say, to promote her ideo-
logical position—then the speaker may be restricted from making
further psychological attacks.126 But, alternatively, if the demonstra-
tor shows grotesque images to children for the purpose of
educating them as to the results of abortion, or to persuade their
views on the matter, this would not be proscribable although it
presents the same disturbing content and potentially causes the
same psychological injury. The importance of this distinction and
the necessity for a robust intent element in the reformulation can-
not be understated. Without this element, even under an IIED
standard, communities and judges could continue to restrict
speech based on their distaste for the message or the propriety of
its expression.
Accordingly, the proposed reformulation would recognize a
compelling state interest in restricting speech that amounts to an
objective and intentional assault on children’s psychological well-
being. And though potential restrictions would nevertheless need
to be narrowly tailored according to their particular circumstances,
the contours of the new state interest would curtail how far those
123. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
124. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2010).
125. Id. at 1216.
126. This approach is not substantially different from Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Sny-
der v. Phelps. Id. at 461–63 (Breyer, J. concurring). Indeed, it is merely an example of Court’s
“approach in recent decades [of] treat[ing] content-based permanent injunctions much the
same as content-based liability.” Volokh, supra note 14, at 918 n.92.
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proscriptions could stretch. The reformulation would thus achieve
a satisfactory, and currently lacking, balance between protecting
children and ensuring broad First Amendment protection.
B. Addressing Potential Obstacles Facing the Reformulation
There are three potential obstacles that may limit the viability of
using intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) as a model
for shaping the state’s interest in regulating disturbing speech.
First, the psychological harm resulting from disturbing speech may
be different from that resulting from garden-variety IIED. Second,
even if it is taken for granted that IIED provides the most theoreti-
cally sound model, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Snyder v.
Phelps127 might foreclose its applicability in cases involving speech
on matters of public concern. Third, because of the heightened re-
quirements under this proposal, the reformulation may not go far
enough in protecting children.
The first obstacle facing the proposed reformulation is that the
psychological harm associated with disturbing speech may be differ-
ent from the emotional distress associated with IIED. To be sure,
there is some support for this position found in the case law. For
example, in Olmer v. City of Lincoln, the Eighth Circuit referred spe-
cifically to speech that is not simply distressing, but psychologically
“damaging” to children.128 Likewise, in St. John’s II, the Colorado
Court of Appeals distinguished its holding from Brown by emphasiz-
ing the “different psychological harm” resulting from disturbing
images as compared to the supposed desensitizing effects flowing
from violent video games.129 Furthermore, the fact that none of the
disturbing speech opinions independently draw similarities be-
tween the children’s psychological injuries and IIED might further
suggest that there is something unstated yet distinct about the
harm.
These arguments are not persuasive. Even if disturbing speech
results in somehow unique harms, it does not follow that an IIED
model is unsuitable. There is nothing in the conceptualization of
IIED that limits its applicability to temporary emotional harm or a
specific manifestation of harm. The only limit is the severity of the
127. 562 U.S. 443 (2010).
128. Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1999).
129. Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott (Saint John’s II), 296 P.3d 273, 278–79
(Colo. App. 2012). For lengthy critique of this aspect of the Saint John’s II opinion, see Calvert
et al., supra note 15, at 133.
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injury, which as discussed above is necessary to ensure the earnest-
ness of the claim. Furthermore, it is unsurprising that courts have
not already drawn upon the theoretical foundation of IIED since
none of the plaintiffs brought such a claim. In fact, it was only in St.
John’s II that the court even mentioned the tort, and that was only in
response to appellee’s claim that the injunction was unconstitu-
tional under Snyder v. Phelps.130 And distinguishing the cases, the
Colorado court focused on the context and form of the pro-life
speakers; it did not distinguish on the type of psychological injury.
For these reasons, the notion that an IIED model is unsuitable be-
cause the harms resulting from disturbing speech are unique is
unconvincing.
The second obstacle facing the proposed reformulation is the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps. In that case, the Court
addressed a grieving father’s IIED claim after members of the
Westboro Baptist Church gathered at his son’s funeral to protest
the United States’ general acceptance of homosexuality.131 The
protesters argued that they were not liable because the First
Amendment protected their expression.132 In resolving the case,
the Court identified the key question as whether the church’s
speech dealt with a matter of public or private concern. It deter-
mined that although the funeral was a private matter, the content
of the Church’s protest was of public concern.133 The Court con-
cluded by reemphasizing several points from Hustler—notably that
the “outrageous” standard of IIED is impermissibly malleable and
that in making the determination “a jury is unlikely to remain neu-
tral with respect to the content of the speech, posing a real danger
of becoming an instrument [of] suppression . . . .”134 The Westboro
Baptist Church was therefore constitutionally protected from tort
liability.
The precise holding in Snyder is not clear. Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky argues that the opinion simply reaffirms the nation’s
longstanding commitment to the idea that “speech cannot be pun-
ished, or speakers held liable, just because the speech is
offensive.”135 Others, such as Professor Elizabeth Jaffe, assert that
130. Saint John’s II, 296 P.3d at 277–78.
131. Id. at 448.
132. Id. at 451–52.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 458 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984)) (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
135. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 72, 723–24 (2011). See
also Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Afterthoughts on Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 43, 43 (2011) (“From a scholarly and professional perspective, the United
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Snyder renders IIED “all but obsolete” when it comes to public mat-
ters.136 If these latter scholars are correct and the Court is stating
that speech on matters of public concern can never be subject to
civil liability, then the proposed reformulated compelling state in-
terest would be unconstitutional—at least as applied to
quintessentially disturbing speech like that on abortion. The state
would be effectively claiming a compelling interest in restricting the
same speech on which the Supreme Court held it cannot impose
civil liability. The reformulation would be rightly dismissed. Be-
cause of this, the viability of the proposal turns on the breadth of
the holding in Snyder v. Phelps.
It is unlikely that Snyder stands for the broad proposition that
liability can never be imposed when the underlying speech involves
a matter of public concern. Courts have repeatedly acknowledged
the heightened protection political speech deserves under the First
Amendment, but it has never been interpreted to give speakers
complete immunity.137 It would be surprising then for the Supreme
Court to reverse this approach and establish complete protection
for political speakers. Put simply, public concern cannot be a blank
check for assault. Both Justice Breyer and Justice Alito in their re-
spective Snyder concurrence and dissent stressed this point.138
Justice Breyer also provided a helpful, exemplary reading of the ma-
jority opinion:
While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the picketing
addressed matters of public concern, I do not believe that our
First Amendment analysis can stop at that point. . . . Suppose
that A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault
States Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps added little to the development of free
speech doctrine.”).
136. Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones but Extreme and Outrageous
Conduct Will Never Hurt Me: The Demise of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the
Aftermath of Snyder v. Phelps, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 473, 475 (2011); see also Joseph Russomanno,
“Freedom for the Thought that We Hate”: Why Westboro Had to Win, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 133, 171
(2012) (“After Snyder, intentional infliction of emotional distress is weaker—and perhaps
disabled—in claims stemming from speech.”).
137. For example, a public agency can fire a person for engaging in speech touching on
matters of public concern if representing his employer’s opinions is in his job description
(Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) or if it is disruptive of the agency’s public
mission (McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1985). Likewise, a higher eviden-
tiary showing for defamation is required when the speech involves a matter of public
concern, but it is also not a complete bar to liability (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 282 (1964)). Finally, the court has held that even speech on a matter of public concern
in a traditional public forum can be restricted when it implicates certain privacy interests
(Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)).
138. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 461–63 (2010) (Breyer, J. concurring); id. at 463–66 (Al-
ito, J. dissenting).
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(being newsworthy) would provide A with an opportunity to
transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern.
The constitutionally protected nature of the end would not
shield A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means.139
Indeed, the majority opinion considered the importance of a
speaker’s intent, recognizing that Westboro’s picketing “re-
present[ed] its ‘honestly believed’ views on public issues.”140
Therefore, by sufficiently considering the assaultive intent of the
speaker, as well as the “content, form, and context”141 of the dis-
turbing speech, the proposed reformulation of the state’s
compelling interest could be reconciled with Snyder.
The final obstacle facing the proposed reformulation is that it
may not sufficiently protect children. Because the reformulation
places more exacting boundaries on those psychological harms that
states can claim a compelling interest in preventing, some instances
of disturbing speech will go unaddressed. It is admittedly unlikely
that demonstrators will use grotesque images for the primary pur-
pose of psychologically assaulting children: it is more probable that
they would be motivated by their sincere beliefs on a contentious
issue. Because the proposed reformulation would not recognize a
valid state interest in restricting such earnest speech, some children
would still be exposed to disturbing images and may still experi-
ence emotional harm. Indeed, Palm Sunday services would remain
vulnerable to disruption.142
But although the state’s hurdle under the reformulation is
higher, it is not insurmountable. For example, the injunction in
Bering v. SHARE would likely be upheld under the reformulated
standard.143 Recall that in that case, the court enjoined pro-life
protestors from referring to “children or babies as being ‘killed’ or
‘murdered’ by anyone in the Medical building.”144 Because the chil-
dren were unable to understand the rhetorical effect of the
139. Id. at 471 (Breyer, J. concurring).
140. Id. at 455; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 499 (1988) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(“Picketing for the sole purpose of imposing psychological harm on a family” is not constitu-
tionally protected.).
141. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 444.
142. The court in Saint John’s II noted that “[t]he posters’ gruesome images were highly
disturbing to children in the congregation apart from any message they intended to convey.”
296 P.3d at 276. While it is impossible to know how the court reached this conclusion, it must
be stressed that under the reformulation there would be no need to attempt the impossible
calculus of whether speech was more disturbing or more political. The analysis would focus
on the speaker’s assaultive intent, and not the content of the speech.
143. Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986).
144. Id. at 933.
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demonstrators’ admittedly political speech, they heard only that
they were in immediate, physical danger. Though the Washington
court did not scrutinize the contours of the injury—and did not
mention IIED at all—they recognized that there was “compelling
state interest in avoiding subjection of children to the physical and
psychological abuse inflicted.”145 Under the proposed reformula-
tion the result would likely be similar. The factfinder would
determine whether the demonstrators knowingly and intentionally
assaulted the children by using words and phrases calculated to put
young minds in a psychologically arresting position. If so, as per-
haps made clear by the demonstrators’ knowledge that the children
were incapable of comprehending their message, the state would
maintain a compelling interest in enjoining further abusive demon-
strations under the reformulation.146 Therefore, by adopting an
IIED model courts may still secure the state’s interest in preventing
psychological assault of children while simultaneously guaranteeing
speakers’ right to vigorously communicate their political messages.
CONCLUSION
While a compelling state interest in protecting children’s psycho-
logical well-being from disturbing speech may exist in the
constitutional ether, it is not founded in precedent. And constitu-
tional principles counsel against creating new categories of
disfavored speech. But this is not to suggest that the interest should
be ignored. Children are impressionable and their psychological
health should not be undervalued. Yet if courts choose to restrict
disturbing speech, they must carefully formulate the interest they
are vindicating. This Note has proposed using intentional infliction
of emotional distress as a model. It argues that this model would
allow for greater scrutiny of the emotional harms claimed and allow
states to restrict those who intentionally cause psychological harm
to children. This theoretically rigorous approach would also ensure
that speech was not restricted merely because of distaste for its con-
tent or propriety of its expression. Most importantly, it ensures a
constitutional balance between protecting speakers and protecting
audiences.
145. Id.
146. For an argument that even this kind of verbal assault is of political importance, see
Volokh, supra note 14, at 945.
